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CHAPTER 16 
Insurance 
J. ALBERT BURGOYNE 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§16.1. Motor vehicle insurance: Loading and unloading coverage. 
August A. Busch & Co. of Massachusetts v. Liberty Mutual Insurance 
CO.l was a suit in equity brought by a beer manufacturer and its in-
surer against V-Dryvit Auto Rental Company and its insurer to deter-
mine the respective liabilities of the two insurers. The controversy 
arose out of the use by the beer manufacturer of a truck leased from 
V-Dryvit to deliver beer to a restaurant. In order to make the delivery, 
the beer manufacturer's employees removed fifty cartons of beer from 
the truck, stacked the cartons on the sidewalk and then hauled them, 
five cartons at a time, on a two-wheeled hand truck a short distance 
down an alley. After removal from the hand truck the cartons were 
again stacked on the ground alongside an open alley door of the res-
taurant. Thereafter they were slid down a shute through a trap door 
located just inside the alley door and again stacked in the basement. 
The beer manufacturer's employees then entered the basement of the 
restaurant and placed the cartons in an icebox. While they were thus 
engaged, a prospective customer of the restaurant entered the alley 
door, fell through the open trap door and was seriously injured. 
The motor vehicle liability policy issued by Liberty Mutual to 
V-Dryvit purported to insure the beer manufacturer as lessee of the 
truck against liability to "pay ... damages to others for bodily in-
jury ... caused by the ownership, operation, maintenance, control or 
use of the motor vehicle." The policy further provided that "use of 
the motor vehicle for the purposes stated includes the loading and un-
loading thereof." The liability of Liberty Mutual depended upon 
the scope of the coverage afforded by this provision and the case pre-
sented a question of first impression. The Supreme Judicial Court en-
dorsed the "complete operation" rule, i.e., the unloading operation 
covers not only the removal of goods from the motor vehicle but also 
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their delivery to a purchaser; and rejected the more restricted doctrine 
that unloading has ended when the goods have come to rest after re-
moval from the vehicle. This is probably in accord with the numerical 
weight of authority. In reaching this conclusion the Court pointed to 
the use by Liberty Mutual of policy language that had already pro-
duced conflicting interpretations2 and the consequent latent ambiguity 
of meaning which must be resolved against it. The insured, in the 
view of the Court, would naturally understand unloading to be a con-
tinuous transaction ending with the deposit of the goods in the hands 
of the purchaser and the drafter of the policy should have expected 
that the policy provision would be so interpreted. 
§16.2. Motor vehicle insurance: Guest occupant exclusion. Pez-
zuolo v. Travelers Insurance CO.1 was a bill in equity to reach and ap-
ply the defendant insurer's obligation under the compulsory insurance 
provisions of a motor vehicle liability policy in satisfaction of judg-
ments obtained by the plaintiff and her husband against an insured 
under the policy. The policy excluded "bodily injury ... of any 
guest occupant of the motor vehicle" and defined guest occupant in 
the terms of the compulsory insurance law2 to mean any person not an 
employee of the owner or registrant of the motor vehicle nor a passen-
ger for hire in a vehicle registered for carrying passengers for hire. 
There was evidence at the trial of the negligence action that would 
support a jury finding that the plaintiff was a business invitee to whom 
the insured owed a duty of due care, but would not warrant a finding 
that she was an employee so as to bring her within the exception of the 
guest occupant definition. The Supreme Judicial Court, reversing the 
decree of the Superior Court, held that the "guest occupant" exclusion 
is inclusive not only of those who are "guests" for the purposes of de-
termining the liability of the owner or operator of a motor vehicle. but 
also of those who are business invitees. The insured was liable for the 
injury sustained by the plaintiffs, but that injury was not within the 
coverage of the policy. 
§16.3. Life insurance: Misrepresentation in application. Lennon 
v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance CO.1 was an action of con-
tract by the beneficiary to recover the proceeds of a policy of insurance 
on the life of her husband. There was evidence that on June 26, 1950, 
a biopsy was' performed on the insured as a hospital out-patient; that 
the biopsy disclosed cancer of the larynx; and that the cancerous 
growth was excised in an operation performed on July 17. After the 
biopsy but prior to admission to the hospital for the subsequent opera-
tion, the insured applied for a policy of life insurance which was issued 
by the defendant on July 27. In his application the insured stated that 
2 For a review of the cases, see Annotation, 160 A.L.R. 1251 (1946). See also 1959 
Ins. L.J. 81. 
§I6.2. 1338 Mass. 678,156 N.E.2d 795 (1959). 
2 G.L., c. 90, §34A. 
§16.!!. 11959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 607.157 N.E.2d 518. 
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he had not been treated for cancer, had not undergone surgery except 
for a recent hernia, and had not during the previous five years been 
treated in any hospital. On April 21, 1952, the insured died of cancer 
of the pancreas. The beneficiary acknowledged that she knew the in-
sured had cancer when the policy was issued, but testified that the in-
sured had no knowledge of the cancerous condition. 
A misrepresentation will not defeat a policy unless the misrepresen-
tation is made with actual intent to deceive or the matter misrepre-
sented increased the risk of loss.2 A misrepresentation of the absence 
of cancer increases the risk as a matter of law,3 but a question asking an 
applicant for insurance if he has ever had a certain disease calls only 
for an answer to the best of the applicant's knowledge or belie£.4 Here 
the applicant'S assertion of the absence of cancer was an innocent mis-
representation, but his lack of knowledge of his condition did not re-
lieve him of the obligation to report the subsequent operation to the 
insurance company. This operation, performed between the date of 
application and the effective date of coverage, in the opinion of the 
Court, increased the risk as a matter of law. The insured was under 
an obligation to disclose it, whether or not he knew it was for cancer,5 
and his failure to do so constituted a material misrepresentation that 
avoids the policy. 
§16.4. Bankers blanket bond: Forgery. In Rockland-Atlas Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co.,! the 
bank sought to recover from its bonding company under a Bankers 
Blanket Bond Standard Form No. 24 for a loss sustained as a conse-
quence of its reliance upon a forged financial statement and account-
ant's letter in agreeing to participate in a loan purportedly made by 
the Guaranty Trust Company of Waltham to the Nashua Sales Com-
pany. An officer of the Waltham bank and an officer of the purported 
borrower were indicted and convicted "in connection with this trans-
action for stealing the property of Guaranty." The acceptance by the 
plaintiff bank of a certified financial statement and the accountant's 
letter was in accordance with the prior course of dealings between the 
two banks. 
Recovery could be had under the Form No. 24 bond, if at all, only 
under insuring clause (E) which provides coverage for "Any loss 
through the insured's having, in good faith and in the course of busi-
ness . . . given any value ... on the faith of . . . any securities, doc-
uments or other written instruments which prove to have been coun-
terfeited or forged as to the signature of any . . . person signing in 
2 G.L., c. 175, §186. 
3 McDonough v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 228 Mass. 450, 453, 117 N .E. 
836,838 (1917). 
4 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Burno, 309 Mass. 7, 11, 311 N.E.2d 519, 520 
(1941). 
II Gabbett v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 11011 Mass. 41111. 21 N.E.2d 950 
(1939). 
flU. IUS Mus. 730,157 N.E.2d 239 (1959). 
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any ... capacity." The Supreme Judicial Court construed clause (E) 
as encompassing "securities and writings something like securities" and 
rejected the argument that the word "documents" was intended to in-
clude within the clause "any formal writing." In support of this con-
struction the Court pointed to the enumeration in clause (E) of the 
category of signers whose signatures may be forged, i.e., "any maker, 
drawer, issuer, endorser, assignor, lessee, transfer agent or registrar, ac-
ceptor, surety or guarantor or . . . any person signing in any other 
capacity" and read the catchall phrase, ejusdem generis, as meaning 
"in any other similar capacity." In the Court's view the word "instru-
ments" was the key word in the phrase and brings within the coverage 
only those writings made and executed as the expression of some act, 
contract or proceeding and does not include a false certified financial 
statement. 
§16.5. Policy insuring agreements: Defense, settlement, supplemen-
tary payments. In Murach v. Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance 
Co.! the plaintiffs sought to hold their motor vehicle liability insurer 
for its failure to settle a tort claim which resulted in a verdict against 
them in an amount substantially in excess of their policy coverage. 
The tort action against the plaintiffs sought damages in the amount of 
$20,000; the applicable limit of liability under the plaintiffs' policy 
was $10,000. On the trial the claimant had a jury verdict for $4900, 
but a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was inade-
quate was granted unless within ten days the parties agreed to an addi-
tur of $7500. When the original suit was filed and again when the new 
trial was ordered the insurer communicated to its insured the fact of a 
possible verdict in excess of policy limits and suggested the possibility 
that he retain personal counsel. In response to the insurer's second 
communication the insured indicated a belief that the claimant's in-
juries were feigned and her damages exaggerated and that, in any case, 
he was judgment proof. Before the second trial the claimant made an 
offer of settlement to the insurer for $9300, which offer was not disclosed 
to the insured; on the first day of the second trial the insurer made a 
counteroffer of $7500, which was rejected. On the new trial the claim-
ant had a jury verdict of almost $30,000. 
The policy insuring agreement, providing that " ... the company 
shall . . . defend any suit against the insured. . . even if... 
groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company may make such in-
vestigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems 
expedient," gives to the insurer complete discretion in the matter of 
settlement. In determining the liability of the insurer for failure to 
settle within the policy limits the Supreme Judicial Court applied the 
test of "good faith" laid down in Abrams v. Factory Mutual Liability 
Insurance Co.,2 in which it was stated that "something more must be 
shown than [the insurance company] failing to make a settlement 
§16.5. 11959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 779,158 N.E.2d 338. 
2298 Mass. 141.10 N.E.2d 82 (1937). 
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which a reasonable person exercising due care 'from the standpoint of 
the assured' would have made." 3 The obligation of the insurer to 
exercise good faith requires it to make its decision as to whether to 
settle a claim within the policy limits or to try the case as it would 
if there was no limit of liability applicable to the claim. On the evi-
dence reported the Court upheld the finding of the trial judge that the 
insurer exercised its judgment in good faith and that it had fulfilled its 
obligation to disclose to the insured his adverse interest. Although its 
failure to advise the insured of claimant's offer of settlement was of 
evidential value in determining the good faith of the insurer, it was 
possible for the trial judge to conclude that the insurer reasonably be-
\
lieVed that the insured was not interested in being kept informed of 
the progress of settlement negotiations. 
§16.6. Policy conditions: Assistance and cooperation. During the 
1959 SURVEY year two cases involving the assistance and cooperation 
clause came before the Supreme Judicial Court. Cassidy v. Liberty Mu-
tual Insurance Co.! was a bill in equity to reach and apply the non-
compulsory provisions of a motor vehicle liability policy in satisfaction 
of a judgment obtained by the plaintiff against Smith as a consequence 
of injury sustained while riding as a guest' in an automobile owned 
and operated by Sullivan, but registered and insured by Smith. Prior 
to the trial of the tort action Smith repeatedly stated that he was the 
owner of the automobile, but when the case came to trial he admitted 
that he did not own the automobile. The insurer thereafter continued 
the defense under an agreed reservation of rights to disclaim liability. 
When the plaintiff brought this bill, the insurer set up the defenses 
of fraud in procuring the policy and non-cooperation in the defense of 
the tort action. The Court held that when the insured has misrepre-
sented his insurable interest in the automobile in negotiating a policy 
of insurance with intent to deceive the insurer, his misrepresentation 
may be deemed material so as to enable the insurer to avoid the pol-
icy.2 Moreover, the intentional furnishing of false information of a 
material nature either before or at trial is a breach of the cooperation 
clause. Since the action involved the non-compulsory coverage of the 
policy, any defense available against the insured is available against 
the claimant since the latter's rights can rise no higher than those of 
the insured. 
The first case in Massachusetts to raise the question of the insurer's 
duties under the customary assistance and cooperation clauses was 
Imperali v. Pica.3 This was a bill in equity to reach and apply the non-
compulsory provisions of the defendant's motor vehicle liability policy 
in satisfaction of a judgment obtained by the plaintiff as a consequence 
of injury sustained when he was struck by an automobile owned and 
8298 Mass. at 145, 10 N.E.2d at 84. 
§16.6. 1338 Mass. 139, 154 N.E.2d 353 (1958). 
2 See G.L., c. 175, §186. 
a 558 Mass. 494, 156 N.E.2d 44 (1959). 
, 
i 
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operated by the defendant. In the original tort action an appearance 
was entered for the defendant by a ·firm of attorneys representing the 
insurance company. Subsequently, following receipt from the plain-
tiff's attorney of a demand to admit facts, an attorney of the firm repre-
senting the company dictated and signed a letter advising the defend-
ant that he was being represented by the firm, that a demand to admit 
facts had been received and that he should arrange to come to the office 
within ten days so that answers could be prepared for his signature. 
This letter was never mailed. Six days later it was delivered by an em-
ployee of the company in person and at the time of delivery was read 
to the defendant, who agreed to "get in touch right away." The de-
fendant failed to do so and no reply to the demand to admit facts was 
ever filed and no extension of time within which to reply was either 
sought or obtained. 
An insurer may terminate its liability under a policy if the insured 
commits a material breach of the cooperation clause~ut the insurer 
will not be relieved when it has not itself exercised reasonable diligence 
in seeking cooperation from the insured. The cooperation clause im-
poses reciprocal obligations. The insured must cooperate, but the in-
surer is obliged to exercise diligence and good faith in bringing this 
about. Moreover, the attorney undertaking the defense of a case rep-
resents both the insured and insurer and owes to each a duty of good 
faith and diligence in the discharge of his duties, and rights of one can-
not be subordinated to those of the other. On the facts of the present 
case the Court held that the trial judge was not plainly wrong in find-
ing that the insured did not cooperate "in a vital and immediate mat-
ter" pertaining to the defense of the tort case. The breach was ma-
terial, even though the facts in the demand were true, because the com-
pany is entitled to the insured's verification of the facts under oath at 
the time the demand was served. The mere fact that the only conse-
quence of the failure to answer the demand was that facts were deemed 
admitted would not render the breach of the cooperation clause imma-
terial. 
§16.7. Policy conditions: Other insurance. In Beattie v. American 
Automobile Insurance CO.I the plaintiff sought to reach and apply to 
the satisfaction of the unpaid half of an execution held by him the 
obligations of the defendant American Automobile Insurance Co. un-
der a motor vehicle liability policy issued to the lessee of a motor truck 
and of the defendant United States Casualty Co. under a substantially 
similar policy issued to a truck renting company. In addition to com-
pulsory insurance, the American policy afforded excess bodily injury 
liability limi~s of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident and 
property damage liability coverage limited to $50,000 per accident; the 
United States Casualty policy afforded $25,000 per person and $50,000 
4, Polito v. Galluzzo, 887 Mass. 860, 149 N .E.2d 375 (1958), discussed in 1958 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §18.8. 
§16.7. 1838 Mass. 526.156 N.E.2d 49 (1959). 
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per accident excess bodily injury liability limits and $5000 property 
damage liability coverage. Both policies contained the "Other In-
surance" clause providing that "the company shall not be liable . . . 
for a greater proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liabil-
ity stated . . . bears to the total applicable limit of liability of all valid 
and collectible insurance." To this clause in the American policy was 
added a proviso reading: "provided, however, the insurance with re-
spect to temporary substitute motor vehicles under insuring agreement 
IV or other motor vehicles under insuring agreement V shall be excess 
over any other valid and collectible insurance." The Supreme Judicial 
Court rejected the unexplained finding of the trial judge that the cov-
erage under the American policy was excess over that afforded by the 
United States Casualty policy, pointing out that a truck used exclusively 
in the business of the lessee under a long-term lease was neither a 
"temporary substitute" for a vehicle withdrawn from normal use for re-
pair or servicing nor "any other vehicle" within the Use of Other 
Motor Vehicles coverage granted under a policy issued to an insured 
individual. On this record two policies, each requiring proration of 
the loss, provided coverage, the total loss is within the compulsory cov-
erage of each, and each insurer is therefore liable for one half the loss. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§16.8. Motor vehicle insurance. The special commiSSIon ap-
pointed to investigate and study the motor vehicle laws and the in-
surance laws as they relate to motor vehicles l filed its report for con-
sideration by the 1959 session of the General Court.2 This commission 
made a thoroughgoing inquiry into the related matters of highway 
safety and motor vehicle insurance and included in its extensive report 
a number of legislative recommendations. The legislative changes 
recommended by the majority of the commission would have strength-
ened the functions of the State Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Lia-
bility Policies and Bonds, permitted the writing of so-called "unin-
sured motorists" coverage, established a Massachusetts Highway Patrol, 
required mandatory suspension of driving licenses for certain offenses, 
established "no-fix" traffic law enforcement, provided state-wide driver 
training in high schools, required re-examination of licensed drivers, 
restricted driving privileges of operators under eighteen, and permitted 
the adoption of local pedestrian control (anti-jaywalking) laws. Of 
these recommendations, all but the authorization of "uninsured motor-
ists" coverage were bypassed and referred to the next annual session. 
Acts of 1959, c. 438,8 enacts a new section in the insurance law au-
thorizing the issuance of motor vehicle liability policies which also un-
§16.8. 1 Resolves of 1956. c. 125; Resolves of 1958. cc. 27. 102. discussed in 1958 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §18.l0. 
2 Senate No. 466 (1959). 
a Adding new §I lID to G.L .• c. 175. 
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dertake to pay to an insured under the policy all sums which he is en-
titled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an unin-
sured motor vehicle for bodily injury caused by accident and arising 
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor ve-
hicle. This coverage is now generally written in other states and was 
first developed and has since been widely proposed as a substitute for 
compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance,4 a system which, until 
recently and for more than thirty years, was unique in Massachusetts.5 
The coverage, in effect, puts the innocent victim of the uninsured 
motorist in essentially the same position as he would have been had the 
uninsured motorist been insured, but also puts him in the anomalous 
position of seeking indemnity from his own insurer and assuming the 
burden of additional premium payments because the uninsured is un-
willing to insure. The extension of motor vehicle liability policies 
to afford this coverage probably makes more sense in Massachusetts 
than in states without a compulsory insurance law, since the primary 
need for protection of Massachusetts residents is occasioned by the en-
try of uninsured motorists into the state. 
Because of the coverage requirement that the uninsured motorist 
be liable for damages and because of the peculiar nature of the cov-
erage which puts the insured in the position of pressing a third party 
liability claim against his own insurer, the new law requires that pro-
vision be made in the policy or in the policy endorsement that entitle-
ment to recovery and the amount of damages shall be determined by 
agreement or, if agreement cannot be reached, by arbitration. The 
new law further provides that the Accident and Sickness Policy Pro-
visions Law6 shall not apply to a policy or endorsement affording this 
coverage, even though it is a form of accident and sickness insurance. 
Acts of 1959, c. 438, also amends the section of the insurance law au-
thorizing medical payments coverage under liability policies7 to au-
thorize the issuance of motor vehicle liability policies8 which also pro-
vide, irrespective of legal liability, accidental death or disability bene-
fits payable on account of injury or death arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of motor vehicles. This form of accident and sick-
ness insurance, limited to the motor vehicle hazard, has likewise been 
widely written in other states as a supplement to the standard forms of 
automobile insurance policies. This coverage can now be written on 
the Massachusetts motor vehicle liability policy, and the policy need 
4 A number of states have made the inclusion of uninsured motorists coverage in 
automobile liability policies mandatory: California (effective September 18, 1959); 
New Hampshire (effective September I, 1957); New York (effective January I, 1959); 
Oregon (effective January I, 1960); South Carolina (effective January I, 1961); Vir-
ginia (effective July I, 1958). 
5 Compulsory automobile insurance legislation became effective in New York in 
February, 1957, and in North Carolina in January, 1958. 
6 G.L., c. 175, §108. 
7 Id. §llIC. 
8 G.L., c. 90, §34A. 
8
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not comply with the provisions of the Accident and Sickness Policy 
Provisions Law.9 
§16.9. Motor vehicle insurance: Illegal registration. For fifty 
years a legal anomaly has persisted in Massachusetts in the form of a 
rule declaring an unregistered or illegally registered motor vehicle to be 
a trespasser, an outlaw and a public nuisance on the highway. This 
doctrine was first enunciated in Dudley v. Northampton Street Railway 
CO.,1 which held that the owner of an unregistered motor vehicle may 
not recover for personal injury or property damage unless the other 
party is guilty of willful, wanton or reckless misconduct. Moreover, 
the owner of the unregistered or illegally registered motor vehicle was 
held liable for damages suffered by another when neither party was 
negligent.2 As recently as 1941 the Supreme Judicial Court in Malloy 
v. Newman3 imposed liability upon such an owner for damages caused 
by the negligent driving of one who had stolen the illegally registered 
motor vehicle, a case which was subsequently overruled by the Court4 
to impose one of the few limitations on the "trespasser on the high-
way" doctrine. 
This harsh rule has been widely criticized and the Court has several 
times indicated that it no longer favors its retention.1I However, in a 
recent case,6 a majority of the Court specifically refused to overrule the 
Dudley case, pointing out that the rule had stood for forty-six years 
without repeal by the legislature and that "its termination should be 
at legislative, rather than at judicial, hands." The legislature has re-
sponded to this invitation in Acts of 1959, c. 259, which amends the 
statute7 to provide that failure to register or the improper registration 
of a motor vehicle will not render the vehicle a nuisance or any person 
a trespasser on the highway, unless the violation of the registration sec-
tion was in fact a proximate cause of the injury, death or damage. 
,/ Such violation will hereafter be deemed only evidence of negligence 
on the part of the violator. 
§16.10. Motor vehicle insurance: Leased vehicles. Under the pro-
visions of Acts of 1959, c. 282, every person engaged in the business of 
leasing motor vehicles under the "drive-it-yourself" system is required, 
effective January I, 1960, to maintain a motor vehitle liability policy 
or bond or deposit covering not only compulsory bodily injury liability 
protection but also property damage liability protection in the amount 
of $1000.1 For the 1960 and subsequent registration years property 
damage liability insurance or equivalent indemnity or protection shall 
II Id., c. 175, §108. 
§16.9. 1202 Mass. 443,89 N.E. 25 (1909). 
2 Koonovsky v. Quellette, 226 Mass. 474, Il6 N .E. 243 (1917). 
3310 Mass. 269, 37 N.E.2d 1001 (1941). 
4 Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81 N.E.2d 560 (1948). 
Ii See, e.g., Dean v. Leonard, 323 Mass. 606, 83 N.E.2d 443 (1949). 
6 Comeau v. Harrington, 333 Mass. 323, 130 N.E.2d 554 (1955). 
7 G.L., c. 90, §9. For further comment on this amendment, see §3.8 supra. 
§16.l0. 1 Section I, amending G.L., c. 90, §32E. 
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be a prerequisite to the registration of any motor vehicle to be leased 
under any such system.2 The definitions of "motor vehicle liability 
policy" and "motor vehicle liability bond" 3 and the requirements for 
a substitute security deposit4 are amended to impose this additional 
requirement. The penalty provided for the operation of an uninsured 
motor vehicle shall not apply to a person who operates a leased "drive-
it-yourself" motor vehicle without knowledge that the lessor has failed 
to comply with the compulsory insurance requirements.5 
§16.11. Life insurance. Acts of 1959, c. 209, amends the definition 
of group life insurance! to permit life insurance to be written on a 
group basis on those persons to whom policy loans have been granted 
pursuant to the provisions therefor in life insurance policies. This act 
also amends the required group life insurance policy provisions section2 
to prescribe that such a policy issued to an insurance company covering 
persons to whom policy loans have been granted contain a provision 
that a form will be delivered to each person insured stating that his 
life is insured and that any death benefit payable shall be applied to 
reduce or extinguish the policy loan. 
Acts of 1958, c. 574, amends the statute3 permitting payment by the 
insured debtor of the premium for insurance on his life afforded under 
a policy of group creditors' life insurance to allow such payment from 
the proceeds of the loan or otherwise. It further amends this section 
to provide that such payment shall not constitute a charge upon a loan 
in violation of the small loans act,4 if the amount collected from the 
borrower, irrespective of the amount of the premium charge to the 
creditor, does not exceed 50 cents per $100 per year of the original loan 
and charges, or 71 cents per month per $100 of outstanding indebted-
ness, or proportionate rates for different periods or amounts of insur-
ance. In the event of prepayment of the loan the borrower is entitled 
to a refund to be calculated upon the same basis as is prescribed for a 
precomputation refund under the small loans act.5 
§16.12. Group insurance: Agents and agency employees. Acts of 
1959, c. 261, amends the statute permitting life and accident and health 
insurance companies to establish a plan of insurance or retirement 
benefits for their agents and the agents' employees! to provide that 
eligibility requirements and the determination of benefit amounts shall 
be based exclusively upon the sale of life insurance, accident and health 
2 Cf. C.L., c. 90. §IA. 
3 Acts of 1959. c. 282. §§2 and 3. amending C.L., c. 90, §34A. 
4 Id. §4. amending C.L.. c. 90, §34D. 
5 Id. §5. amending C.L.. c. 90. §34J. 
§16.11. 1 C.L.. c. 175, §133(c), as amended by Acts of 1958. c. 188. noted in 1958 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §18.12. 
2 C.L., c. 175, §134(4A). as added by Acts of 1955, c. 169. 
3 C.L., c. 175, §134. as amended by Acts of 1951, c. 404. 
4 C.L.. c. 140, §§96-114A. 
5 Id. §100. 
§16.l2. 1 C.L.. c. 175. §36A, added by Acts of 1948, c. 496. 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1959 [1959], Art. 20
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1959/iss1/20
182 1959 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSElTS LAW §16.13 
insurance and annuity contracts and may not take into account the 
sale of any other kind of insurance. 
§16.13. Group insurance: Public employees. Acts of 1958, c. 558, 
amends the Group Insurance Plan for Employees of the Common-
wealth! to make employees of local housing or redevelopment author-
ities eligible for insurance, and further amends the Group Insurance 
Plan for Employees of Counties, Cities, Towns and Districts2 to ter-
minate eligibility of such employees under the latter insurance pro-
gram. This change in eligibility became effective on January 1, 1959,3 
but such employees who become insured under the provisions of the 
earlier enactment will continue to be so insured until the contracts in-
suring their group insurance benefits expire, and the provisions of the 
state employees' insurance plan will not apply until such expiration.4 
Acts of 1958, c. 536, amends the definition of an employee eligible 
for the Group Insurance Plan for Employees of Counties, Cities, Towns 
and Districts5 to require that compensation must be received for the 
services rendered to the governmental unit, to specify that at least 
twenty hours be worked during the regular work week, and to exclude 
seasonal and emergency employees. 
Acts of 1958, c. 580, amends the Group Insurance Plan for Em-
ployees of Counties, Cities, Towns and Districts6 to extend eligibility 
for insurance to employees of a free public library maintained in a city 
or town, provided the city or town annually contributes at least half 
the cost of maintaining the library. 
§16.14. Policy conditions: Proof of loss. An insured under a Mas-
sachusetts Standard Fire Policy! is protected by statute against for-
feiture of coverage for failure to give proper notice or proof of loss 
with respect to a loss by fire or by any other hazard insured against un-
der such a policy.2 If the insured fails to render to the insurer the 
sworn statement prescribed by the policy, he may, nevertheless, recover 
if he forthwith gives to the insurer written notice of the loss and there-
after complies with a written request to render the sworn statement; 
but in the absence of such a written request, the insurer's obligation is 
fixed and the period within which payment must be made runs from 
the receipt of the written notice. Moreover, if the insured fails to ren-
der the prescribed sworn statement or to give a written notice he may, 
nevertheless, recover if the insurer sends out a representative to adjust 
the claim and if the insured thereafter complies with a written request 
§16.l3. ! C.L., c. 32A, §2, added by Acts of 1955, c. 628, discussed in 1955 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §17.3. 
2 C.L., c. 32B, §2, as amended by Acts of 1958, c. 136, noted in 1958 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §18.I3. 
3 Acts of 1958, c. 558, §6. 
4 Id. §5. 
I) C.L., c. 32B, §2, added by Acts of 1955, c. 760. 
6 C.L., c. 32B, §7, as amended by Acts of 1958, c. 536. 
§16.14. ! C.L., c. 175, §99. 
2 Id. §102. 
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to render the sworn statement; but in the absence of such a written 
request, the insurer's obligation is fixed and the period within which 
payment must be made runs from the time its agent was sent to adjust 
the claim. Acts of 1959, c. 168,3 now provides the same protection to 
an insured who fails to render a sworn statement of loss or damage 
from any hazard insured against under any policy issued in the Com-
monwealth. 
§16.15. Policy conditions: Subrogation. The principle of law that 
a bailor who is not himself negligent and who is not bound by the neg-
ligence of his bailee may recover from a third person for damage to 
the property bailed resulting from the concurring negligence of the 
bailee and the third person was settled in Massachusetts in Nash v. 
Lang.1 Relying upon the rule of the Nash case the Supreme Judicial 
Court in Morris Plan Co. v. Hillcrest Farms, Inc.2 held that the con-
ditional vendor of an automobile could recover from a third person 
for negligently damaging the automobile while it was in the possession 
of a conditional vendee in default, notwithstanding the latter's con-
tributory negligence, at least to an amount not in excess of the sum 
still owed under the conditional sales agreement. Two cases in 1958 
further developed this rule of law favoring the conditional vendor 
or chattel mortgagee. Bell Finance Co. v. Getter3 allowed recovery of 
the full amount of automobile collision damage even though the con-
ditional vendee at the time of the accident was not in default. Finally, 
Harvard Trust Co. v. Racheotes4 allowed recovery in a case in which 
the chattel mortgagor was contributorily negligent and the amount of 
damage to the automobile exceeded the unpaid balance of the loan 
which was not in default. However, to forestall the unjust enrichment 
of the mortgagor, the Court limited the amount of recovery to the 
amount of the loan then unpaid. 
It was apparent in these latter cases that the real complaining party 
in interest was the automobile physical damage insurer of the holder 
of the security interest in the damaged automobile. Through these 
subrogation actions the property losses are shifted from the physical 
damage insurers to the liability insurers, thus accomplishing only an 
uneconomic redistribution of such losses among insurers. Moreover, 
it is a matter of some concern to insurance companies generally that 
the captive insurers of the major automobile financing companies5 are 
the principal beneficiaries of a rule that subjects an automobile owner 
to a liability for collision damage which he would not otherwise have 
simply because a third person has a security interest in the other auto-
3 Adding new §186A to G.L.. c. 175. 
§16.l5. 1268 Mass. 407.167 N.E. 762 (1929). 
2323 Mass. 452.82 N.E.2d 889 (1948). 
3337 Mass. 69. 147 N.E.2d 815 (1958). discussed in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§§3.2. 7.2. 18.9. 
4337 Mass. 73. 147 N.E.2d 817 (1958). discussed in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§§3.2. 7.2. 18.9. 
5 See 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §7.2 at p. 80 n.26. 
12
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1959 [1959], Art. 20
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1959/iss1/20
184 1959 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §16.16 
mobile involved in the accident. These captive insurers customarily 
do not write liability insurance, but limit their underwriting to physical 
damage coverages on financed automobiles and have acquired a major 
share of this market. These considerations prompted the successful 
effort of the insurance companies to obtain legislation rejecting this 
judicially established rule of law. 
Acts of 1959, c. 300,6 adds to the General Laws a new section pro-
viding that in an action to recover for damage to a motor vehicle 
brought in the name of a person holding a security interest in the 
motor vehicle, any defense available against the registered owner shall 
be available against the person holding the security interest. Thus a 
subrogated physical damage claim in the hands of a person having a 
security interest in the damaged motor vehicle is subject to the same 
defenses as may be raised against the owner of the vehicle. The hold-
ing of Morris Plan Co. V"Hillcrest Farms, Inc. is no longer law; the 
rule of Nash v. Lang continues unaffected. 
§16.16. Insurance companies. Acts of 1959, c. 128,1 authorizes in-
vestment by domestic insurance companies in bonds, notes, evidences 
of indebtedness, or contractual obligations of the United States or any 
instrumentality thereof, or of any state of the United States, including 
joint, undivided or participating interests in such obligations. 
Acts of 1958, c. 575, provides for the inclusion of annuity considera-
tions in the base for the insurance excise tax imposed upon domestic 
life companies,2 excluding, however, such considerations paid by an 
annuitant who is a resident of a state or country to which the company 
actually pays an excise tax based upon life insurance premiums. Under 
this statutory change the exclusion is permitted whether or not the 
company pays to the state or country of the annuitant's residence an 
excise tax based upon annuity considerations. 
Acts of 1959, c. 249,3 extends to July 25, 1961, the authority of in-
surance companies to make or acquire real estate mortgage loans to 
veterans guaranteed by the Administrator of Veterans Affairs. 
6 Adding new §85E to G.L.. c. 231. 
§16.l6. 1 Amending G.L.. c. 175. §63. par.!. 
2 G.L.. c. 63. §20, as amended by Acts of 1943. c. 531. §1. 
8 Amending Acts of 1945. c. 46. as amended by Acts of 1957, c. 78. 
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